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ABSTRACT
The study presented in this paper deals with copying answers
in MOOCs. Our findings show that a significant fraction of
the certificate earners in the course that we studied have used
what we call harvesting accounts to find correct answers that
they later submitted in their main account, the account for
which they earned a certificate. In total, ∼2.5% of the users
who earned a certificate in the course obtained the majority
of their points by using this method, and ∼10% of them used
it to some extent. This paper has two main goals. The first is
to define the phenomenon and demonstrate its severity. The
second is characterizing key factors within the course that af-
fect it, and suggesting possible remedies that are likely to de-
crease the amount of cheating. The immediate implication of
this study is to MOOCs. However, we believe that the results
generalize beyond MOOCs, since this strategy can be used in
any learning environments that do not identify all registrants.
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INTRODUCTION
The issue of academic dishonesty in higher education has
been studied for at least half a century. According to Mc-
Cabe and Trevino [4], studies report that between “13 to 95
percent of college students engage in some form of academic
dishonesty” (p. 523). The survey study by Davis [3] reported
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cheating rates of up to 88%. The specific numbers depend on
how one defines and measures academic dishonesty, but the
overall picture is that of a severe, widely spread phenomenon.
Singhal [9] described cheating as one of the major problems
in education today.
Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) offer free access to
complete courses often containing both lectures and prob-
lems. Students who demonstrate a satisfactory level of
achievement can earn a certificate of accomplishment. While
these certificates currently do not have formal value, the fact
that many people tend to include them in resumes and pro-
fessional social networks indicates that they are perceived by
some as an indication of knowledge and proficiency. There
is also evidence that they have value in the job market1. An-
other use of MOOC certificates is in academic admissions,
e.g. Wharton Business School announced that it will use its
MOOCs as an additional tool for selecting MBA candidates
[2]. This can explain, at least partially, the motivation of some
students looking for easy ways to earn MOOC certificates.
In this study we detect the use of multiple accounts by the
same student for copying answers. The method works as fol-
lows. The student uses one or more harvesting accounts (the
harvester/s) to obtain the correct answer, and then submits it
in the master account, the account for which the student in-
tends to earn a certificate. Finding the answer in the harvester
account can be done either by asking to see the correct an-
swer after using all the attempts (‘show answer’ on the edX
platform), or by exhaustive search (e.g. pure guessing for
multiple choice questions) until the correct answer is found.
This is a clear case of academic dishonesty since it explicitly
violates the edX honor code (which all registrants agree to)
that requires that users “Maintain only one user account”, and
“Not engage in any activity that would dishonestly improve
my results”2. The findings that we present below show that
this phenomenon is quite widespread. For example, about 5%
of the certificate earners in our course harvested at least 10%
of their correct answers; 2% used it for more than 70% of
their correct answers.
The phenomenon of using harvesting accounts was also re-




ple courses offered by MITx and HarvardX [6]. They coined
the term CAMEO (Copying Answers using Multiple Exis-
tence Online) for this phenomenon, and we adopt this term.
In the context of cheating in digital learning environments,
another closely related work is the one by Palazzo et al. [8].
They studied the amount of copying answers from another
student using the same online homework tutor, and found that
the fraction of copied answers ranged between 3 and 11%.
CAMEO also resembles what Baker et al. [1] defined as
gaming the system – “Attempting to succeed in an interactive
learning environment by exploiting properties of the system
rather than by learning the material” – both in terms of the
motivation (improving grades), and in terms of the method
(exploiting technical features of the system).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section we define the phenomenon and the detection method.
In the Results section we present the results of applying the
method on a specific course. In the Discussion section we
discuss the findings, followed by summary and main conclu-
sions in the last section.
HARVESTING SOLUTIONS USING MULTIPLE ACCOUNTS
This section is organized as follows. First, we define the phe-
nomenon. Second, we state the criteria that we use for iden-
tifying an answer as having been harvested. Third, we define
behavioral patterns. Fourth, we give a high-level description
of the algorithm that implements the patterns.
Defining the phenomenon
CAMEO refers to an event in which a user uses one or more
accounts to find the correct answer to a question, and then
submits this answer in his/her main account. We refer to
the account(s) used for finding the solution as the harvest-
ing accounts (or the harvester/s), and to the account in which
the answer is submitted as the master account. A CAMEO
event can thus be described as a triplet of the form <master,
harvester, question>. The criteria for identifying CAMEO
events are described below.
Criteria
Each triplet must also adhere to the following criteria:
1. Harvester and master belong to the same IP group. IP
group is a group of accounts that shared the same IP at least
once in the course, or are connected through an account
with whom both shared an IP (this criterion is applied re-
cursively). It is defined as follows. Let G=(U, I, E) be a
bipartite graph in which U represents the set of the users, I
represents the set of the IPs, and E are the edges between
U and I, when an edge (u,i) denotes that user u has used
IP i at some point in the course. For each connected com-
ponent cc within G (a connected component is a subgraph
in which there is a path between each two nodes), then the
nodes of cc that belong to U (the ‘user’ nodes) form an
IP group. Identifying connected components in a graph is
a basic problem in graph theory, and can be computed in
linear time.
2. Harvester does not have extrinsic motivation. This is op-
erationalized as harvester does not earn a certificate. The
rationale is clear - earning a certificate indicates that the
user seeks a reward from time invested in this account,
reducing the likelihood that this is a ‘service’ account.
We note that this requirement may ignore ‘heavy’ harvest-
ing accounts, i.e., accounts that accumulate enough course
credits to earn a certificate solely due to extensive harvest-
ing.
3. Harvested questions are actually used in the master ac-
count. The rationale that underlies this criterion is that if
a student establishes an account to harvest answers, then
most of the questions done by this account will be used by
a master account. Thus, we require that at least 85% of the
solutions obtained by the harvester were actually used by a
master. We picked 85%, and not 100%, to allow for some
flexibility, for example in case that the user solves a ques-
tion in the harvester account, but then decides to skip it in
the master account because he/she realizes that it is a ran-
dom question (thus the solution in the master account can
be different; we elaborate on the effect of randomization
below).
4. Master harvests at least 10 answers. The intention is to in-
crease our certainty that the student used this pattern to har-
vest answers; therefore this filter adds a minimum count of
harvested answers to consider the student as using the pat-
tern. This threshold represents about 1% of the questions
required for a certificate.
5. Master account is not used for harvesting solutions. The
rationale is similar to the one in criterion 2, in the opposite
direction.
Harvesting patterns
We define two CAMEO patterns: Immediate, and delayed
batch. In both patterns, a harvesting event is composed of
the harvester getting the correct answer in his/her account ei-
ther using ‘show answer’ or by using exhaustive search, fol-
lowed by the master submitting the correct answer in his/her
account. The harvester and master should also adhere to the
criteria listed above (the Criteria subsection). The patterns are
described below. A graphical representation of them is given
in Figure 1.
Immediate mode. This pattern refers to a situation in which
the user harvests the solution in the harvesting account, and
inserts it in the master account shortly after. The threshold
that we use is of up to 15 minutes between the two events.
The main hypothesized modus operandi behind this pattern
is that of a user who is progressing in the two accounts si-
multaneously, using two browsers (in order to login with two
accounts at the same time). In this case we require that both
actions were done by the same IP address.
Delayed batch mode. This pattern refers to a situation in
which the user harvests the solution for multiple answers, and
then submits them in a rapid sequence in the master account.
The main hypothesized modus operandi behind this pattern
is of a user who harvests multiple solutions, stores them, and
later submits them in a batch, possibly in a different physical
location and/or using a different machine, but one in the same
IP group as explained in the first criterion. The threshold that
we use for the length of the sequence is of (at least) 10 cor-
rect submissions, and the threshold that we use for ‘rapid’ is
less than 20 seconds between two consecutive ones. To avoid
overlap with the immediate mode, we also require that there
will be at least 15 minutes gap between the last harvesting
event and the first master event in this sequence. We note
that cheating events that are part of a batch mode sequence,
but with less than a 15 minutes delay, will be caught by the
immediate mode. So in such cases the event would still be
detected.
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the two harvesting patterns
(H=Harvester, M=Master)
Completeness of the two patterns. We note that the two pat-
terns do not fully cover the range of harvesting possibilities.
For example, a sequence consisting of less than ten questions
that are harvested and then submitted by the master more than
fifteen minutes after they were harvested will not be detected.
Also, we have used global thresholds that were not adjusted
for specific questions. We deliberately picked very strict def-
initions so as to follow our general approach that in the study
of academic dishonesty, it is better to decrease the false pos-
itive ratio at the expense of increasing the false negative one.
The implication is that our algorithm is probably not detect-
ing all the harvesting events. Still, the results are quite signifi-
cant. Thus, we believe that at this stage it is more important to
bring this issue to the attention of the community, rather than
to polish the patterns in order to identify all of the harvesting
events.
Algorithm
Below we give a high-level description of the algorithm. Its
input is the tracking logs of the course, processed to create
per-user, time-sorted log files. Each event in the tracking log
represents a student action, and contains the IP from which
the action that this event represents arrived. A submission to
a question creates an event that contains, among other things,
information about the question (i.e., question ID), the student,
the answer, and whether it is correct or not (more information
on edX tracking logs can be found on edx.org).
1. Process the user log files to build two dictionaries - one that
maps each student to all the IPs used by this student, and
one that maps an IP to all the students who used it at least
once during the course.
2. For immediate pattern: Per user U, for each successful sub-
mission to a problem P at time t, search if any student V
from that IP group has submitted a correct answer, or a re-
quest to see answer, to P in the 15 minutes before t, from
ip. If so, add the triplet to the list of harvesting events.
3. For delayed batch pattern: Per user U, for each sequence
of ten or more successful submissions to questions Pi...Pk,
with no more than 20 seconds between each consecutive
submissions, search if any students V in the IP group of
U, got the answer to Pi...Pk in a similar pattern to the one
described in 2. If so, add the triplets <U, V, Pi>...<U, V,
Pk> to the list of harvesting events.
4. Test for the criteria described in the Criteria subsection.
Remove entries that contain items that do not fulfill these
criteria.
While we hope that this description can be a sufficient starting
point for ones who wish to implement this algorithm, we in-
tend to make the source code of the algorithm publicly avail-
able.
RESULTS
In this section we present the results of running our algorithm
on the data from edX.org MOOC 8.MReVx given in summer
2014. First, we describe the setting. Second, we present the
findings.
Context - Introductory Physics MOOC 8.MReV
Population: The MOOC 8.MReVx was run on edX.org in
Summer 2014. It attracted about 13500 registrants, of which
502 earned a certificate. Gender distribution was 83% males,
17% females. Education distribution was 37.7% secondary
or less, 34.5% College Degree, and 24.9% Advanced Degree.
Geographic distribution includes US (27% of participants),
India (18%), UK (3.6%), Brazil (2.8%), and others (total of
152 countries). (All numbers are based on self-reports.)
Course structure: The course covers the standard topics of a
college introductory mechanics course with an emphasis on
problem solving and concept interrelation. It lasted for 14
weeks, with content divided between 12 mandatory units and
two optional ones on advanced topics. The course contains
273 e-text pages, 69 videos, and about 1000 problems. The
problems include checkpoints problems embedded within the
e-text and videos, and homework and quiz questions which
are given at the end of the units.
Tracking logs: The interaction data of the students with the
learning environment is saved on edX servers and was down-




















earners 47 (4.35%) 49 7206 (3%)
Table 1. Amount of CAMEO in our course
usage agreements between edX, MITx and us. The interac-
tion logs were subdivided by user and sorted by time.
Findings
This subsection presents the results of applying the script that
implements the criteria described above on the tracking logs
of 8.MReV. For the purpose of this study, we consider only
students who completed at least 5% of the questions in the
course - a total of 1581 students. Among these, 502 earned
a certificate. The output of the CAMEO detection script is a
list of such triplets <master, harvester, question> labeled as
‘immediate’ or ‘batch’. This list could be then analyzed and
combined with other information on the course to obtain var-
ious statistics. The findings are divided into 4 subsections. In
the first we present an overall view of the amount of cheating
in the course. In the second we compare the performance of
the master and the harvester accounts with the rest of the stu-
dents. In the third we give some descriptive statistics about
CAMEO events. In the fourth we show findings regarding
question characteristics and amount of cheating.
Amount of CAMEO
Number of master and harvester accounts. In total, we iden-
tified 99 master accounts, and 112 harvester accounts, which
constitute 6.3% of the 1581 who completed at least 5% of the
questions in the course. Among the 99 master accounts, 52
were certificate earners (10.3% of the 502 certificate earners)
and 47 were non-certificate earners (4.35% of the non certifi-
cate earners who completed at least 5% of the questions). We
note that some masters operated more than one harvester ac-
count. The rationale is probably to enable exhaustive search
on questions for which the number of allowed attempts is not
enough to find the solution. See Table 1.
CAMEO among submissions. Approximately 3% of all the
correct submissions in the course were harvested (19602 out
of 639863 correct submissions). See Table 1.
CAMEO among certificate earners. Figure 2 shows the
amount of cheating among certificate earners. A point on
the graph represents the amount of the certificate earners who
harvested at least y% of their correct submissions. For ex-
ample, 5.37% of certificate earners harvested ≥10% of their
correct answers. About 2.5% of the certificate earners har-
vested more than 50% of their correct answers. We judge that
to the left of the shoulder at (2, 70%) are students ‘harvesting
for a certificate’ without any attempt to master the required
knowledge.
Figure 2. Percentage of cheating by certificate earners
Cheaters compared with other students
Success rate and response time among certificate earners.
The findings show that within the certificate earners, mas-
ters tend to have a very high average success rate on indi-
vidual problems, and very fast response time (elapsed time
between opening a problem and answering it correctly), com-
pared with the rest of the students. (Here we focus only on
certificate earners in order to compare groups of students that
answered similar numbers of questions). This is illustrated
in Figure 3. The x-axis shows the percentage of correct sub-
missions at the first attempt, and the y-axis shows the average
time needed for a correct submission. Master accounts are
marked in red, with the size of the circle proportional to the
fraction of answers that they harvested. As can be seen, there
is a cluster of red points on the bottom right part of the fig-
ure (fast and correct). In general the trend is that the bigger
the red circle (more cheating), the higher the success rate and
the faster the submission. Also, the top three performers of
the course in terms of minimum time and performance at first
attempt are cheaters. Additionally, we also found that it was
statistically significant that cheaters have better performance
in first attempt submissions and require less time for correct
submissions.
Distribution of performance among masters, harvesters,
and the rest of the students. The distribution of performance
among masters, harvesters, and the rest of the students (ones
who attempted more than 5% of the questions) is presented in
Figure 4. In terms of mean values, masters have a success rate
of 82.5%, harvesters have a success rate of 43.9%, and the rest
of the students have a success rate of 61.6%. The results of an
ANOVA test confirm that the success rate (masters)>success
rate (rest of students) >success rate (harvesters). (F=72.43,
p=10-16).
Figure 3. Response time vs. percentage correct for certificate earners;
size of red dot indicates amount of cheating
Figure 4. Distribution of performance
Characteristics of CAMEO events
Distribution of harvesting between patterns. Approximately
90% of the harvesting events followed the immediate pattern,
and 10% followed the delayed batch pattern.
Harvesting technique. 53.5% of the cheating events were
harvested by asking to see the answer (‘show answer’ button).
46.5% were harvested using exhaustive search.
Harvesting precedes first master answer. 91% of the har-
vested answers preceded the masters first attempt (which was
therefore correct).
Delay of the cheating event. Figure 5 shows the distribution
of the elapsed time between the harvesting event and the sub-
mission in the master account for events in which this delay
was less than 5 minutes (90% of the CAMEO event detected).
The median is 27 seconds with mode=5 seconds; 75% of the
immediate mode submissions were done within 72 seconds
after the harvesting event.
Figure 5. Delay between harvesting and submission: Immediate mode
Factors that correlate with cheating
This subsection presents results on the relation between char-
acteristics of problems and the amount of cheating on these
problems. The main objective is to focus on aspects that we
believe can help instructors design their course in a way that
is less vulnerable to CAMEO.
More harvesting on high-stake questions. Our course con-
tains three types of problems - quizzes, homework and check-
points. Additionally, we also have a midterm and a final
exam, not included in the analysis for this subsection. In
terms of contribution to the final grade, quiz questions have
the highest weight, then homework questions, then check-
points. The information about the weight of the questions
is given in the syllabus of the course, so we can assume that
students are aware of it.
We calculated the average percentage of harvested submis-
sions per type of assignment. On average, the fraction of har-
vested submissions for quizzes, homework and checkpoints
is 1.2%, 0.98% and 0.77%, respectively (of the total submis-
sions; we note that the 3% in Table 1 refers to the percentage
of correct submissions). An ANOVA test confirms that this
difference is statistically significant (F = 3.03, p = 0.046).
Limiting feedback reduces harvesting. We have several
places where questions that are similar in terms of weight
are accompanied by different levels of feedback regarding the
correct answer. The ‘show answer’ feature was not available
before the deadline for quizzes except for one quiz (due to
a mistake in settings). On this specific quiz, harvesting ac-
counted for 3.77% of correct answers, vs. 1.25% on those
without show answer.
Similar findings were obtained when looking at the midterm
and final exams. On the midterm, with the ‘show answer’ dis-
abled, the average amount of cheating was 1.2%, while on the
final exam, on which ‘show answer’ was enabled, the average
amount of cheating was 2.6%. It might have been higher ex-
cept that students who harvest a majority of their answers tend
to stop out when they reach the passing grade and make little
of no effort on the final exam. These results clearly show that
limiting the feedback reduces harvesting. That it does not re-
duce it further reflects that students can still harvest solutions
using exhaustive search utilizing the correct/wrong feedback
that is always given.
Randomization reduces harvesting. In most of the questions
in our course requiring a numerical (vs. algebraic) answer, the
question parameters are randomized (for example, the angle
of an inclined plane), so different accounts see numerically
different variations of the same problem.
We found that there is less cheating on randomized questions,
both globally – the total amount of cheating events, and after
normalizing by the total number of submissions to the prob-
lem.
For randomized questions, the percentage of cheating is
5.84%, while for non-randomized questions, it is 9.23%. In
terms of absolute numbers, the average number of submis-
sions that were harvested per problem with randomized vari-
ables was 10, whilst for the rest of the questions, it was 20.
The normalized results are statistically significant, with p-
value under 0.01 for both the normalized and the absolute
comparisons. Although this was not a randomized trial, we
believe that this indicates a causal relationship, namely, that
randomization decreases cheating by making the harvesting
more difficult. This is further discussed in the next section.
DISCUSSION
Significant use of CAMEO
The findings that we have presented above reveal that a sig-
nificant fraction of the certificate earners in our course - al-
most 10%, used CAMEO to obtain at least ∼1% of their
correct answers. Moreover, they reveal that ∼2.5% of the
certificated users obtained most of their points by using this
method, typically without even inspecting the questions to see
if they might answer them legitimately. Our study is con-
sistent with the hypothesis that the main motivation for this
kind of cheating is to earn a certificate. Although the ob-
servation that a significant amount of cheating was by non-
certificate earners seems to contradict this, we note that the
non-certificate earners that used CAMEO tended to drop out
from the course early, but till then, actually harvested a higher
fraction of their answers than the certificated CAMEO users.
Thus our conclusion is that they started the course with the
intention of earning a certificate dishonestly, but decided to
quit for various reasons (for example, our many questions, or
the many randomized questions that thwart CAMEO), maybe
even moving their CAMEO efforts to somewhere else. This
is also consistent with the finding of Northcut et al. that
CAMEO is more prevalent among users who have many cer-
tificates [6].
We were surprised by the relatively large number of students
who used CAMEO in our course. One would expect that
people would be interested in earning a certificate without
actually learning something in courses that can be used for
gaining external benefits, such as an advantage in the labor
market. This is more naturally associated with programming
and engineering courses, and less with introductory physics
course as ours. So there is no specific reason to believe that
the amount of cheating in our course is particularly high.
The high level of CAMEO may well result from the fact
that MOOCs share features identified by previous work on
academic dishonesty as associated with more cheating. For
example, in [5] it was reported that cheating is more likely
to happen in large and public institutions (vs. small private
ones). According to the analysis of around 80 studies done
in [7], Classroom Environment also has a considerable ef-
fect, with cheating more associated with bigger classrooms
in which there is less individualized attention. Also, accord-
ing to [4], cheating is restricted by what is perceived to be the
social norm.
Altogether, due to the characteristics of MOOCs, of cheat-
ing being a phenomenon that tends to spread, and of MOOC
certificates becoming more valuable, we can expect to see an
increase in the amount of CAMEO in MOOCs, making it a
more significant issue.
Implications
The most important finding of our work is that CAMEO is
quite widespread. Furthermore, CAMEO is only one form
of academic dishonesty: we are not detecting when answers
obtained by one student are given to another student, which
has been observed to occur in ∼ 11% of all answers [8] (vs
the 3% CAMEO found here). Nor have we investigated the
availability of plagiarizing answers from solutions found on
the Internet. So cheating is undoubtedly highly prevalent in
MOOCs.
The main threat is that CAMEO (and other forms of cheat-
ing) will decrease the confidence that the certificates pro-
vide a reliable evidence of knowledge and competency. Thus
we believe that it is important to address CAMEO and other
methods of academic dishonesty that are possible in online
learning environments before they jeopardize the value of the
MOOC certificates. We note that the current ‘verified cer-
tificates’ take steps to assure that the name on the certificate
belongs to the individual who entered the answers in the mas-
ter account, but is not a good defense against CAMEO and
other forms of academic dishonesty.
Besides being a threat to the integrity of MOOC certificates,
CAMEO also interferes with educational research. Our find-
ings show that the users with the highest skill accounts in
our course are masters, and that the lowest skill accounts are
harvesters. This means that any research that tries to study
the behavior of successful students vs. that of unsuccess-
ful ones, might be heavily influenced by these two outlying
groups. For example, if we try to identify the variables that
most strongly correlate with student’s skill, this subset of har-
vester and master accounts would have a significant effect on
the results.
CAMEO almost certainly impacts learning. Users employ-
ing batch mode are foregoing the struggle of trying to answer
questions on their own, and it seems obvious that this will
have a negative effect on their learning. However, it is not
clear that students who use a harvester account to find the
answer to a few percent of the questions that they have strug-
gled with is hurting their learning - indeed it might even be
beneficial. Certainly this is a topic for future research.
Remedies
We now discuss steps that our research shows should reduce,
or at least frustrate, CAMEO.
Our findings clearly show that using randomization of the
numbers in questions reduces CAMEO. Randomization of
question parameters is already supported by the edX plat-
form, and we recommend that instructors use it where pos-
sible, certainly in preference to multiple choice (which can
be harvested using exhaustive search). Randomizing does not
completely defeat CAMEO. A more general form of random-
ization would be using question pools, i.e., group of questions
that require very similar skills at similar level of difficulty, but
have significantly different surface features (i.e. wordings or
symbols chosen for various quantities).
A much simpler-to-implement prevention method is to avoid
giving any feedback on important questions such as exams -
including even the usual true/false feedback. Even allowing
‘show answer’ after the due date enables students to harvest
the answers for use the next time the course is given. The
obvious disadvantage of omitting feedback is that it compro-
mises the learning experience, since immediate feedback is
very important for learning. Individual instructors will have
to trade off whether they want to help the great majority of
students that wants to learn vs assuring the security of the
edX.org certificate.
In the future, CAMEO can be addressed on the platform level,
by adding cheating detection, and by supporting more general
classes of randomization and question pooling along with al-
gorithms for fairly grading students who do not do exactly the
same questions.
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented research on academic dishon-
esty in MOOCs. The specific method that we have studied,
termed CAMEO [6], is based on using multiple accounts to
harvest solutions. Our results show that a significant fraction
of the certificate earners in our course - about 10%, have used
this method to some extent, and that 2.5% of them obtained
the majority of their correct answers by using it. We also
showed that students who used CAMEO tended to have high
success rate and fast response time compared with the other
students. We then found that a question’s characteristics cor-
relate strongly with the amount of cheating on it. This led to
our suggestions for instructional design practices that are less
vulnerable to CAMEO.
Our main conclusions are as follows:
1. CAMEO is already significant among MOOC students, our
study represents a lower bound on CAMEO, and does not
include other forms of academic dishonesty like copying
from other students. Our results suggest that cheating can
jeopardize the validity of the MOOC certificate system.
2. The main motivation for CAMEO appears to be earning
a certificate, consistent with our observation that questions
that weigh heavily towards the overall grade are most likely
to be cheated upon.
3. We show that delaying feedback and using randomization
of problems can reduce CAMEO. Instructors can employ
these with trade-off between pedagogy, prevention, and the
amount of extra work required.
Though the research was conducted in MOOCs, the results
and conclusions are also relevant to other learning environ-
ments that allow users to register additional accounts under
a different user name. This research is only a first step into
studying this phenomenon. Our plans for future research in-
clude:
Generalizing the results. In order to get a better estimation
of the severity of CAMEO, our plan is to extend our research,
and analyze a larger sample of courses. We also intend to
make the source code publicly available.
Run-time detection. In addition to using methods for prevent-
ing CAMEO, it is important to detect it while it happens, so
timely intervention can be made. Thus, we plan to develop a
run-time version of the algorithm. Since the algorithm is quite
scalable, and with small optimizations can be made linear in
the amount of actions in the course, the cost in performance
should be minimal. Also in the context of the algorithm, we
are interested in developing a detector that does not rely on
the IP, as sophisticated users can use various method to hide
their IP address.
Understanding CAMEO. Pedagogy-wise, we are interested
to understand the specific purposes for using CAMEO (for
example, is it a help seeking strategy?). Among other things,
this will extend our understanding of the motivation of learn-
ers in MOOCs, and eventually, can help to improve them.
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